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A THREE-TIERED PUBLIC POLICY APPROACH 




Over two decades since the copyright misuse doctrine was first 
recognized in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, a uniform approach 
for determining whether a specific behavior constitutes misuse still does not 
exist.  Circuit courts have commonly applied two competing approaches to 
the misuse analysis.  One approach centers on the public policy underlying 
copyrights; the other approach centers on antitrust principles. This Note 
explores relevant jurisprudence and elucidates the shortfalls of each 
approach.  It then proposes a compromise that underscores the interplay 
between copyright and antitrust laws.  The proposed resolution aims to 
provide a much-needed uniform misuse analysis that does not overlook the 
important policies underlying copyright law, or disregard antitrust 
principles relevant in the context of tying arrangements. 
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In early December 2012, Google released its “Maps” application for 
Apple’s iPhone.  For many iPhone 5 users, this was indeed an early 
Christmas present.  The iPhone 5, the smartphone that millions of 
Americans preordered and eagerly anticipated for most of 2012, had been 
released without Google Maps and came preloaded instead with Apple’s 
own mapping application.  The decision to replace Google Maps with its 
own mapping application in the iOS 6 operating system is yet another 
example of Apple’s “compulsion . . . to have end-to-end control of every 
product that it [makes].”1  To Apple’s disappointment, however, it became 
immediately apparent that its mapping application was inferior to that of its 
 
 1. WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 561 (2011). 
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rival.2  Saving the day, or more accurately, lost iPhone users, Google 
readily stepped in and released yet another top-notch mapping application.3  
As a leader in technology, Apple has not accepted defeat and is pushing to 
improve its Maps application.4  It is anticipated that Apple’s revamping 
efforts will be evident in its latest iOS 7 operating system.5  As computer 
software, both Apple Maps and Google Maps are copyrighted works.6 
Assuming that Apple is successful in its “quest for perfection”7 and 
creates a superior mapping application for the iOS 7 operating system, 
would conditioning the purchase of the iPhone on the use or purchase of its 
copyrighted mapping application be a misuse of Apple’s copyright?  If so, 
would a defendant in an infringement claim be able to assert the misuse as 
an affirmative defense?  
In this hypothetical scenario, Apple’s attempt to tie one of its products to 
another is a classic example of a tying arrangement.8  A tying arrangement 
involves conditioning the sale or licensing of one product on the customer’s 
agreement to purchase or license another.9  Consistent with that definition, 
a “‘block’ or ‘package’” license, requiring a buyer or lessee to take more 
than one copyrighted product, can also constitute a tying arrangement.10  
The “tying” product is the one sought by the consumer and the “tied” 
product is the one additionally required, which the consumer is essentially 
coerced to purchase or lease.11  In the example above, the iPhone is the 
 
 2. Michael Liedtke, Google Maps Return to iPhone with New Mobile App, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Dec. 13, 2012, 7:14 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/google-maps-return-iphone-
new-mobile-app. 
 3. Nicole Goodkind, Google Maps:  Did Apple Cave to Consumer Pressure?, CNBC 
(Dec. 14, 2012, 12:37 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100315928/Google_Maps_Did_Apple_
Cave_to_Consumer_Pressure (“[Google Maps] has become the most downloaded free 
application in the Apple app store.”); David Pogue, A Better Google Maps App for Apple 
and Android Devices, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://pogue.blogs.
nytimes.com/2013/07/10/an-improved-google-maps-app-for-apple-and-android-devices/. 
 4. Tim Cook, A Letter from Tim Cook on Maps, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/letter-
from-tim-cook-on-maps/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
 5. Daniel Eran Dilger, iOS 7 Maps Go Full Screen, Navigation Gets Night Mode, New 
Siri Options, APPLE INSIDER (July 12, 2013, 12:55 PM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/
13/07/12/ios-7-maps-go-full-screen-navigation-gets-night-mode-new-siri-options. 
 6. See infra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of how software can qualify as copyrightable. 
 7. ISAACSON, supra note 1, at 561. 
 8. James B. Stewart, The Shadow of Steve Jobs in Apple’s Maps Push, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
6, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/06/business/apples-map-app-
could-raise-antitrust-concerns.html. 
 9. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1660 (9th ed. 2009); see also Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. 
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969). 
 10. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 55 (1962), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works 
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
 11. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992); N. Pac. 
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958) (defining a tying arrangement as “an 
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also 
purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that 
product from any other supplier”); Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421, 
1423 (9th Cir. 1995). 
84 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
 
tying product and Apple’s mapping application is the tied product.  This 
Note explores the treatment of copyright misuse in the context of tying 
arrangements in an attempt to answer the questions above and similar ones. 
While tying arrangements can give rise to independent antitrust claims,12 
the focus of this Note is the copyright misuse doctrine and the lack of 
clarity surrounding its application to tying arrangements.  By definition, 
copyright creates a limited monopoly;13 thus, courts frequently invoke 
antitrust law when copyright holders attempt to use their copyright in 
impermissible ways.14  Other courts have approached the copyright inquiry 
from a public policy perspective.15  Therefore, a general understanding of 
both copyright and antitrust laws is necessary to contextualize the different 
approaches courts pursue in determining copyright misuse.16 
From an intellectual property perspective, tying arrangements raise red 
flags because copyright owners and patent holders can use them “to obtain 
property rights outside the scope of the patent and the copyright and [to] 
obtain benefits in markets outside the coverage of the grant.”17  Similarly, 
such arrangements are sometimes condemned from an antitrust perspective 
because they can unlawfully restrain trade of the tied product.18 
Yet a dispute exists regarding whether, in some cases, tying can be 
economically justified.  Many commentators advocate for the continued 
illegality of tying arrangements because such arrangements “injure rivals in 
the tied product market by cutting off their access to adequate markets,”19 
facilitate collusion and “anticompetitive price discrimination,”20 and work 
in opposition to the goal of promoting “the maximization of consumer 
welfare.”21  In contrast, other commentators argue that such arrangements 
should be presumed lawful because of the benefits they confer on buyers 
and society, such as lower transaction costs.22  This Note, consonant with 
the weight of case law, adheres to the former view, maintaining that tying 
arrangements should continue to be proscribed to prevent their harmful 
effects. 
 
 12. See 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ANALYSIS 
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 9–10 (3d ed. 2006). 
 13. See Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc’ns, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 373 (6th 
Cir. 2007). See generally Scott L. Bach, Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory 
Licenses:  Toward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 382–84 (1986). 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. Ilan Charnelle, The Justification and Scope of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine and Its 
Independence of the Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 167, 173 (2002); see infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 19. 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R. 
LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST:  AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 21–32 (2d ed. Supp. 2012). 
 20. Id. 
 21. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & HOWARD A. SHELANSKI, ANTITRUST 
LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE:  CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 1 (6th ed. 2009). 
 22. See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 36–38. 
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Part I provides an overview of copyright and antitrust laws as relevant to 
the context of this Note.  Part II explores policy rationales and relevant case 
law in the context of tying arrangements under the public policy and 
antitrust approaches, respectively, underscoring the lack of uniformity in 
the evaluation of copyright misuse.  Finally, Part III points out the 
inadequacies of these two approaches, which are predominantly applied by 
courts, and proposes a multi-tiered approach that would provide a more 
defined framework to the misuse analysis while holding steadfast to the 
underlying goals of copyright law. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST LAW 
This Part provides background information on copyright and antitrust 
laws for Part II’s discussion of the public policy and antitrust approaches 
and Part III’s proposed three-tiered approach to the judicial treatment of 
possible tying arrangements implicating copyright. 
A.  An Introduction to Copyright Law 
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution enumerates 
important and expansive powers given to Congress.23  Specifically, 
Clause 8 gives Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”24  In 
interpreting this clause, the U.S. Supreme Court has reasoned, 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to 
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful 
Arts.’  Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards 
commensurate with the services rendered.25 
 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 24. Id.  The Patent and Copyright Clause is the basis for U.S. patent and copyright laws.  
While patent law, which protects new innovations, is relevant in the context of the 
development of the misuse doctrine, patent law more generally is outside the scope of this 
Note.  For more information on patent law, see MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING 
COPYRIGHT LAW 31–35 (5th ed. 2010). 
 25. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (observing that the grant of copyright 
protections “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the 
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius 
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired”); Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. 
Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The Clause authorizes the granting of a 
temporary monopoly over created works, in order to motivate authors and inventors while 
assuring the public free access at the end of the monopoly.”); LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 17 
(“In general, arguments for establishing property rights in anything . . . are justified on two 
fundamental grounds:  first, a person’s moral right to reap the fruits of his or her own labor 
. . . and second, a utilitarian rationale that views copyright law as an incentive system 
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This desire to incentivize creators and inventors has become especially 
important in the post-industrial era, which marked the rise of technological 
developments and information industries.26  At the same time, however, a 
capitalistic market crumbles if it abandons its competitive elements and 
becomes overly monopolistic.27  As such, restraints and limitations are 
often put in place to ensure the functionality of our multifaceted, and often 
convoluted, economic system.28  In this manner, the broadly defined 
copyright grants are prevented from becoming excessively or perpetually 
protective at the expense of public creativity and future developments.29 
To provide a clear understanding of copyright law, this section briefly 
summarizes its historical development, the requirements and scope of the 
copyright grant, and the evolution and treatment of the misuse doctrine. 
1.  A Brief History:  From England’s Statute of Anne to 
America’s Copyright Act of 1976 
The first copyright act, the Statute of Anne, was passed in England in 
1710,30 and granted authors the limited exclusive right to make copies of 
their own work.31  This statute was the last response in a series of efforts to 
balance the benefits of the printing press with authors’ ownership rights.32  
The invention of the printing press made the publishing process more time 
efficient and less costly, naturally benefiting publishers and sellers.33  
However, the original authors obtained no additional benefit from these 
large-volume publications.34  The Crown’s first response was to implement 
 
designed to produce an optimal quantity of works of authorship, and thereby enhance public 
welfare.”). 
 26. A 2006 Report estimated that in 2005, the copyright industries accounted for 6.56 
percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, ECONOMISTS 
INCORPORATED, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY:  THE 2006 REPORT 2 (2007), 
available at www.iipa.com/pdf/2006_siwek_full.pdf; see also LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 2 
(“While the U.S. continues to experience large and growing trade deficits, the copyright 
industries continue to thrive in overseas sales and exports.”). 
 27. See generally 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, 
ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 8 & n.2 
(3d ed. 2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9 (2d ed. 2001). 
 28. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–112; infra Part I.A.3. 
 29. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 285 (1996) (“Copyright law strikes a precarious balance.  To encourage authors to 
create and disseminate original expression, it accords them a bundle of proprietary right in 
their works.  But to promote public education and creative exchange, it invites audiences and 
subsequent authors to use existing works in every conceivable manner that falls outside the 
province of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.”). 
 30. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books 
in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.). 
 31. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 2, 4. 
 32. Id. at 4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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temporary measures, chartering the Royal Stationers’ Company,35 which 
exercised essentially unchecked monopoly power over publications and 
prohibited publication prior to its approval.36  After 138 years, however, the 
Company’s exclusive license expired, resulting in unregulated 
competition.37  Parliament responded by passing the Statute of Anne which 
limited authors’ rights to a specific number of years and “declared that [the 
statute’s] ultimate purpose was to enhance public welfare by encouraging 
the dissemination of knowledge.”38  Toward the end of the century, the 
House of Lords reinforced that purpose in Donaldson v. Beckett, which 
established that a copyright does not exist in perpetuity and that the work 
falls into the public domain upon the expiration of the copyright grant.39 
In the United States, the first Copyright Act was passed in 179040 
pursuant to the constitutional authority of the Patent and Copyright 
Clause.41  This Act was “modeled on the Statute of Anne, [and] set the tone 
for future statutes.”42  Over the years, U.S. copyright law has drastically 
changed, covering much broader ground and granting protection for a much 
longer term.43  Nonetheless, two important features of copyright law have 
remained consistent throughout its development in the United States:  its 
acclimation to technological changes and its underlying purpose.44 
In 1905, President Roosevelt “called for complete revision of the 
copyright law to meet modern conditions,” and four years later, Congress 
passed the Copyright Act of 1909.45  Notably, in contrast to prior 
 
 35. The Royal Stationers’ Company was a London-based company that was involved in 
the sale and trade of books. See generally CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY 
31–33 (1960). 
 36. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 4. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 838. 
 40. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831); Colin Morrissey, Note, 
Behind the Music:  Determining the Relevant Constitutional Standard for Statutory 
Damages in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3059, 3064 (2010). 
 41. Some commentators have argued that the source of the language of the Patent and 
Copyright Clause was the Statute of Anne. See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. 
BIRCH, JR., A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT 242 (2009); Marvin Ammori, Note, The 
Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 306–07 (2002).  
However, others have opined that because the Clause was adopted in a secret proceeding and 
without debate, the framers’ intent and the purpose of the clause’s adoption are unknown. 
LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 6; Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights, The Copyright Clause:  
“A Charter for a Living People” (Aug. 10, 1987), reprinted in 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 102–
03 (1987). 
 42. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 6; see PATTERSON & BIRCH, supra note 41, at 242. 
 43. See generally PATTERSON & BIRCH, supra note 41, at 260–64. 
 44. See LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 3–4. 
 45. Id. at 7.  For a detailed discussion of the 1909 Act, see generally W. Ron Gard & 
Elizabeth Townsend Gard, The Present (User-Generated Crisis) Is the Past (1909 Copyright 
Act):  An Essay Theorizing the “Traditional Contours of Copyright” Language, 28 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 455, 458–60 (2011). See also Kate Cross, Comment, David v. 
Goliath:  How the Record Industry Is Winning Substantial Judgments Against Individuals for 
Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1031, 1039–41 (2010). 
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legislation, under the 1909 Act, copyright protection was triggered by 
publication and not by registration of the work,46 and imposed strict 
liability on all infringers.47  The 1909 Act, however, failed to conform to 
the first international copyright convention,48 the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.49  The Berne Convention remains 
the principal copyright convention today, and its success is evidenced “by 
its large number of adherents, which by the mid-1980s included every 
major country in the world except China, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States.”50  The 1909 Act conflicted with the Berne Convention in two major 
ways:  (1) it required notice on all published works, and (2) it provided for a 
much shorter term of copyright protection.51  As a result, the 1909 Act 
prevented the United States from conforming with international copyright 
law.52 
Congress amended the 1909 Act gradually, reflecting the evolving needs 
of society and rapid technological changes.53  Eventually it became 
apparent that a new and revised copyright statute was necessary, and 
Congress authorized revision efforts in 1955.54  After two decades “of 
reports and extensive hearings,” the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed.55  
In 1989, the United States finally became a contracting party to the Berne 
Convention.56 
2.  Title 17:  Expansive Copyright Protection 
The Copyright Act of 1976 was codified in Title 17 of the U.S. Code and 
constitutes the current federal law on copyright protection.57  This section 
will explain its important provisions. 
 
 46. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 7. See Gard & Gard, supra note 45, at 468 (“Under 
the 1909 Copyright Act, federal legal protection only occurred upon the act of publication, 
recognized as a required series of formal steps that gave proper notice of one’s intent to 
enforce the copyright. In contrast, federal copyright protection under the 
1976 Copyright Act arises automatically upon creation of the work . . . .”). 
 47. See generally Matt Jackson, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:  An Historical 
Analysis of Copyright Liability, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 381–83 (2002). 
 48. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 7–8. 
 49. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 7, Sept. 
9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended Sept. 28, 1979). 
 50. Id. at 8. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 7–8. 
 53. Id. at 9. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INT’L PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).  For more 
information on the implementation of the Berne Convention in the United States, see 
LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 11–15. 
 57. Also, to the extent that federal and state copyright laws conflict, federal law 
preempts. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228 (1964); MARY 
LAFRANCE, COPYRIGHT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 2 (2008). 
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a.  The Statutory Requirements 
Section 102 of Title 17 provides that copyright protection subsists “in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, 
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”58  Based on § 102, there are three copyright 
requirements:  (1) originality, (2) works of authorship, and (3) fixation in a 
tangible medium.59  This section provides a brief explanation of each of the 
requirements, respectively. 
Originality of the work is the first requirement and the “sine qua non of 
copyright.”60  To be original, a work must be both independently created by 
the author and at least minimally creative.61  A work is independently 
created if it is not copied from other works,62 and any “creative spark” 
satisfies the creativity requirement, “‘no matter how crude, humble or 
obvious’ it might be.”63  Generally, the author of the work is presumed to 
be the one that created the work in question and the one entitled to 
copyright ownership.64  Nonetheless, a legal entity, such as a corporation, 
can be the “author” of the work under the work for hire doctrine.65   
 
 58. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  In other words, “two essential elements—[an] original 
work and [a] tangible object—must merge through fixation in order to produce subject 
matter copyrightable under the statute.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976). 
 59. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 60. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); see Harper & 
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (“The copyright is limited 
to those aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that display the stamp of the author’s 
originality.”). 
 61. See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345. 
 62. See id. at 345–46 (“[A] work may be original even though it closely resembles other 
works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.  To illustrate, assume 
that two poets, each ignorant of the other, compose identical poems.  Neither work is novel, 
yet both are original and, hence, copyrightable.”). 
 63. Id. at 345 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT 
§ 1.08[C][1] (1990)).  “Originality does not require ‘novelty, ingenuity, or aesthetic merit.’” 
Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
94-1476, at 51 (1976)); see Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–
03 (2d Cir. 1951) (“All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that 
the ‘author’ contributed something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something 
recognizably ‘his own.’” (quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d 
Cir. 1945))); see also Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 278 (6th 
Cir. 1988). 
 64. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 
737 (1989). 
 65. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘work made for hire’ is—(1) a work prepared by an employee 
within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned 
for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an 
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly 
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made 
for hire.”); see also Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1969) 
(Friendly, J., dissenting); LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 195–96. 
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“Works of authorship” is the second statutory requirement and includes:  
literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and 
choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural 
works.66  This list of categories is illustrative of copyrightable expressions 
and is not exhaustive.67  The first category, “literary works,” is defined as 
“works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or 
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the 
material objects . . . in which they are embodied.”68  Computer programs 
and software copyright protection falls under this category.69  Because 
“‘literary works’ in section 101 includes expression not only in words but 
also ‘numbers, or other . . . numerical symbols or indicia,’” computer 
programs, which are expressed in object code, are also copyrightable.70 
It is important to note, however, that copyright protection for any work of 
authorship is limited to how an idea is expressed and does not extend to 
“any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”71  Such material is 
subject to patent, not copyright, protection.72 
 
 66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(8). 
 67. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54 (1976) (stating that the list of categories are 
“‘illustrative and not limitative,’ and . . . do not necessarily exhaust the scope of ‘original 
works of authorship’ that the bill is intended to protect”); see LAFRANCE, supra note 57, at 8. 
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94–95 (2d 
Cir. 1987); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see also 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (holding that while facts 
are not protected, the specific compilation of the facts can fall within the scope of copyright 
protection). 
 69. See LAFRANCE, supra note 57, at 16 (stating that the “literary works” category 
“includes all types of computer software—operating system software and applications 
software”); LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 101; see, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phx. Control 
Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 
725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 
F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 70. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1249 (“[A] computer program, whether in 
object code or source code, is a ‘literary work’ and is protected from unauthorized copying, 
whether from its object or source code version.”). 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).  For example, “[w]hile the factual information conveyed in a 
map, such as landmarks and street locations, is not entitled to copyright protection, ‘any 
originality in the manner of expression employed in communicating the factual information’ 
can be protected by a copyright.” City of N.Y. v. Geodata Plus, LLC, 537 F. Supp. 2d 443, 
450 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 
460, 467 (2d Cir. 2002)); see Corbello v. DeVito, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1152 (D. Nev. 
2012) (“Copyright law only protects expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.” (quoting 
Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 624–25 (9th Cir. 2010))); see also 
Anthony J. Mahajan, Note, Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Reverse Engineering After 
ProCD:  A Proposed Compromise for Computer Software, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3297, 3301 
(1999). 
 72. See LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 31–32. 
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As to the third and last requirement, a work is “fixed” if it is in any 
“tangible medium of expression,” such as in writing or a drawing.73  The 
tangible embodiment must be “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it 
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than transitory duration.”74  If the fixation is made without the 
author’s consent, however, such as recording a concert where recording was 
prohibited, it will not qualify for copyright protection.75 
While the foregoing underscores the expansive scope of the statute, the 
requirements it sets forth are quite permissive.76  The first requirement, 
originality, is satisfied based on a de minimus standard—so long as the 
work is not copied and there is a spark of creativity.77  The second 
requirement, work of authorship, encompasses a long and not exhaustive 
list of categories, so that virtually any original work can be found to meet 
this requirement.  The last requirement, fixation, is met so long as any 
tangible medium of expression is used, which practically only excludes 
conversations and other events not captured via a tangible medium at the 
time they occurred.  Accordingly, a wide range of works can be copyrighted 
under the statute. 
b.  Statutory Grants and Enforcement 
Once an original work of authorship is fixed in tangible form,78 the 
statutory requirements of ownership are met and copyright protection is 
triggered,79 giving the owner the exclusive right to reproduce,80 distribute 
copies,81 publically perform82 or display the work,83 and prepare derivative 
 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  For example, “an unscripted live event, such as a football game, is 
ordinarily not eligible for copyright protection.  In contrast, a recording of that event is 
copyrightable.” LAFRANCE, supra note 57, at 11. 
 75. 17 U.S.C. § 1101; see LAFRANCE, supra note 57, at 12–13. 
 76. See generally Deborah Kemp, Copyright on Steroids:  In Search of an End to 
Overprotection, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 795, 805 (2010); Mark E. Dailey, Abstraction, 
Filtration, Comparison:  The Difficult Task of Defining and Applying an Appropriate 
Substantial Similarity Test for Computer Software, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 415, 442 (2001). 
 77. “Originality is not a stringent standard; it does not require facts be presented in an 
innovative or surprising way.” Am. Massage Therapy Ass’n v. Maxwell Petersen Assocs., 
Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 941, 947 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 78. See supra Part I.A.2.a. 
 79. Copyright protection automatically attaches to the copyrightable work. STEPHEN 
FISHMAN, THE COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK 7 (Richard Stim ed., 10th ed. 2008); see LAFRANCE, 
supra note 57, at 3 (“Under current law, compliance with formalities is not a prerequisite to 
copyright protection.  Thus, a work that satisfies § 102 is protected by federal copyright from 
the moment it is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, without regard to whether it bears 
a copyright notice or has been registered.”). 
 80. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
 81. Id. § 106(3). 
 82. Id. § 106(6). 
 83. Id. § 106(5). 
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works.84  Copyright protection runs for the life of the author plus seventy 
years.85  For joint works, the seventy-year term starts to run upon the death 
of the last author.86  If the author is unknown, or if the work is a product of 
work for hire, protection lasts for 120 years from creation or ninety-five 
years from publication, whichever is first to expire.87 
The copyright owner may also choose, but is not required, to register the 
copyright with the U.S. Copyright Office.88  As long as the certificate of 
registration is made before, or within five years of, the work’s first 
publication, it constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the 
certificate and the copyright’s validity.89  Registration and subsequent 
notice of the copyright is also beneficial to the owner because it gives the 
public notice of the protected work, and eliminates the possibility that the 
defendant’s liability will be mitigated based on an assertion of innocent 
infringement.90 
Copyright infringement involves the exercise of a copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights without prior authorization.91  The burden of proof in a 
copyright infringement claim falls on the plaintiff, who must establish 
ownership of a valid copyright and the defendant’s infringement of that 
copyright.92  More specifically, the copyright owner must establish three 
things:  (1) the existence of a valid copyright by proving that the 
requirements of § 102(a) are satisfied,93 (2) violation of the owner’s 
exclusive right under § 106, and (3) improper appropriation by showing that 
the infringer created a “substantially similar” work to the copyrighted 
work.94 
3.  The Misuse Doctrine Puts Copyright Protection in Check 
The courts, pursuing a balance between protecting authors and inventors 
and enabling market competition, have further shaped and limited the broad 
constitutional grant enumerated in Article I and the expansive protections 
set forth in Title 17.  The copyright misuse defense doctrine is a product of 
that pursuit.  The misuse defense “has its historical roots in the unclean 
hands defense,”95 barring intellectual property owners from recovery when 
a defendant affirmatively proves that the culpable plaintiff used the 
 
 84. Id. § 106(2). 
 85. Id. § 302(a). 
 86. Id. § 302(b). 
 87. Id. § 302(c). 
 88. FISHMAN, supra note 79, at 7. 
 89. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). 
 90. Id. § 401(d). 
 91. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 419. 
 92. Int’l Media Films, Inc. v. Lucas Entm’t, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
 93. See supra Part I.A.2.a. 
 94. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 419–20; see FISHMAN, supra note 79, at 319. 
 95. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 792 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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protected intellectual property right “to secure an exclusive right or limited 
monopoly not [otherwise] granted.”96 
Misusing the copyright does not invalidate it but rather renders it 
unenforceable until the misuse has been “purged.”97  This has been 
interpreted as requiring that “the improper practice has been abandoned and 
that the consequences of the misuse of the patent [or copyright] have been 
dissipated.”98  While the copyright is unenforceable due to misuse, any 
defendant or potential defendant can affirmatively raise the misuse defense, 
even in the absence of any injury or harm.99  In other words, causal 
connection between the misuse and the injury is not a required element of 
the misuse defense. 
The misuse defense is an affirmative defense.100  Briefly, this means that 
a defendant invoking the misuse defense concedes infringement if the 
copyright use is valid, but asserts that the plaintiff was using its copyright in 
an improper way.101 
The copyright misuse defense was a logical extension of the patent 
misuse defense.102  Patent misuse was first expressly recognized in the 1942 
Supreme Court decision, Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.103  In 
Morton Salt Co., G. S. Suppiger Company licensed its patented salt-
depositing machines on the condition that users use the patentee’s own salt 
tablets with the leased machines.104  When Morton Salt Company failed to 
do so, the patentee brought an infringement claim against Morton Salt 
Company seeking an injunction and damages.105  The Supreme Court 
refused to grant the patentee relief, reversing the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision.106  The Seventh Circuit’s holding was based on the finding that 
the tie-in had not “substantially lessened competition or tended to create a 
monopoly” and thus did not constitute a violation of antitrust laws.107  
Contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s antitrust approach, the Supreme Court 
 
 96. Id. at 793; see infra Part II. 
 97. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 n.22 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 98. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942), abrogated by Ill. 
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
 99. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978; Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., No. C 08–03251 
WHA, 2009 WL 303046, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009). 
 100. See Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 
Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986); David Scher, 
Note, The Viability of the Copyright Misuse Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 94 (1992). 
 101. See LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 535. 
 102. See generally Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973; Charnelle, supra note 17, at 168–74; 
Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of Copyright:  
Reconsidering Copyright Misuse, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 565, 570 (2006) (“Copyright misuse 
is a [sic] not a new doctrine. It emerged from patent law and has been used by the courts 
since the landmark patent misuse case, Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.”). 
 103. 314 U.S. 488. 
 104. Id. at 490. 
 105. Id. at 489. 
 106. Id. at 490. 
 107. Id. 
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purported to apply an “equity rationale,” pursuant to which public policy 
“forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited 
monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to 
public policy to grant.”108  Interestingly, the Court did not specify how the 
use was “contrary to public policy,” and instead limited its analysis to a 
showing that the patent secured a “limited monopoly not granted by the 
Patent Office.”109  The Court held that the tying arrangement was an 
attempt to “restrain competition in the marketing of unpatented articles, salt 
tablets, for use with the patented machines, and [was] aiding in the creation 
of a limited monopoly in the tablets not within that granted by the 
patent.”110 
Though this case arose as an antitrust claim under the Clayton Act, the 
Supreme Court decided it in its capacity as a “court of equity,” considering 
simply whether the patentee’s action was “contrary to public policy.”111  
The Court’s public policy analysis differed in form, but not in function, 
from the Seventh Circuit’s antitrust analysis, because both were concerned 
with restraints on competition, an antitrust concept.112  While the two courts 
seemed to apply different analyses, they actually reached opposing 
conclusions based on varying interpretations of the facts.  Simply stated, the 
Seventh Circuit, applying an antitrust analysis, found that competition was 
not restrained.  By contrast, the Supreme Court, purporting to apply a public 
policy analysis but in fact applying an antitrust analysis, found that 
competition was restrained. 
Unsurprisingly, this landmark decision, often cited by courts applying 
and extending the misuse doctrine, left much uncertainty and confusion for 
subsequent courts to weed through.113  This Note addresses how later 
decisions, extending to copyrights the misuse doctrine as it was first 
articulated in Morton Salt Co., have reached different conclusions as to 
whether the antitrust or the public policy approach is appropriate in the 
misuse analysis.  Furthermore, those applying the latter approach have not 
done so with the same public policy considerations in mind.114 
This lack of uniformity is exacerbated by the fact that, in the context of 
copyrights, the Supreme Court has not expressly approved or upheld the 
misuse defense.115  The Supreme Court has, however, suggested in a 
 
 108. Id. at 492 (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 491 (emphasis added). 
 111. Id. at 490. 
 112. G. S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1941), rev’d, 314 U.S. 
488 (1942), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
 113. See Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense:  The Role of Antitrust Standards 
and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (1991) (“Almost immediately, 
the relationship between patent misuse doctrine and antitrust law became confused.”). 
 114. See infra Part II.A. 
 115. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[N]o United 
States Supreme Court decision has firmly established a copyright misuse defense in a 
manner analogous to the establishment of the patent misuse defense by Morton Salt.”).  
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number of other cases that “the purpose and policy of patent misuse apply 
as well to copyright,”116 and has also “given at least tacit approval of the 
defense”117 in United States v. Loew’s, Inc.118  In Loew’s, Inc., the 
defendants, distributors of copyrighted motion picture feature films, 
“conditioned the license or sale of one or more feature films upon the 
acceptance by the station of a package or block containing one or more 
unwanted or inferior films.”119  The Court, applying an antitrust analysis, 
found it “clear that the tying arrangements here both by their ‘inherent 
nature’ and by their ‘effect’ injuriously restrained trade” and held that 
recovery for infringement should be denied.120  In this decision, the Court 
extended the patent misuse doctrine to copyrights, reasoning, 
“Accommodation between the statutorily dispensed monopoly in the 
combination of contents in the patented or copyrighted product and the 
statutory principles of free competition demands that extension of the patent 
or copyright monopoly by the use of tying agreements be strictly 
confined.”121  In doing so, the Court implicitly approved, but fell short of 
expressly articulating, the copyright misuse defense.122 
Nonetheless, the copyright misuse defense has been expressly articulated 
by a number of lower courts and was even applied far earlier than its 
articulation, as evinced in M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen.123  In this 1948 
decision, the plaintiffs, motion picture companies, alleged copyright 
infringement by defendants, theater owners, of certain copyrighted musical 
compositions.124  The defendants countered that the plaintiffs were not 
entitled to relief because they had illegally extended their copyrights and 
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.125  Based on the finding that the 
plaintiffs had the “power to deny to any theatre owner . . . the right to 
 
Nonetheless, “[t]here is little doubt that copyright misuse will eventually resurface in the 
Supreme Court and be reconciled. On this point, lower courts and commentators alike agree; 
however, divergent opinions abound as to what should be the proper scope and guiding 
principles for copyright misuse.” Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common 
Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse:  A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 888 (2000). 
 116. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(collecting Supreme Court cases); see Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976 (“[S]ince copyright and 
patent law serve parallel public interests, a ‘misuse’ defense should apply to infringement 
actions brought to vindicate either right. . . .  Both patent law and copyright law seek to 
increase the store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding inventors and authors with the 
exclusive rights to their works for a limited time.  At the same time, the granted monopoly 
power does not extend to property not covered by the patent or copyright.”). 
 117. Atari Games Corp., 975 F.2d at 846. 
 118. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 38 (1962), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works 
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
 119. Id. at 40. 
 120. Id. at 49–50 (quoting United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911)). 
 121. Id. at 49. 
 122. Charnelle, supra note 17, at 171. 
 123. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948). 
 124. Id. at 844. 
 125. Id. 
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exhibit films containing Ascap music,”126 a right without which “no theatre 
owner would be able to stay in business,” the district court held that the 
plaintiffs unlawfully extended their copyright monopoly, and thereby 
violated the public policy goals of copyright law.127  As a result, the court 
also held that “it [was] not necessary to determine whether anti-trust 
violations alone would deprive plaintiffs of the right of recovery.”128  By 
denying recovery to the copyright owners based on both the defendants’ 
antitrust contention and the finding that the plaintiffs had illegally extended 
their copyrights, the court effectively permitted application of what is 
known today as the copyright misuse defense.129 
In 1990, the copyright misuse defense was clearly articulated by the 
Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds.130  In Lasercomb, 
the plaintiff, a software program developer, brought an infringement claim 
alleging that defendants acted in violation of the standard licensing 
agreement, which restricted “licensees from creating any of their own 
CAD/CAM die-making software.”131  The court extended the patent misuse 
defense to copyrights and explained its rationale as follows: 
The origins of patent and copyright law in England, the treatment of these 
two aspects of intellectual property by the framers of our Constitution, 
and the later statutory and judicial development of patent and copyright 
law in this country persuade us that parallel public policies underlie the 
protection of both types of intellectual property rights. . . .  [T]hese 
parallel policies call for application of the misuse defense to copyright as 
well as patent law.132 
Accordingly, the court held that the broadly restrictive licensing terms 
constituted a valid defense of copyright misuse and the plaintiff “should 
have been barred . . . from suing for infringement of its copyright.”133 
Since then, many district and circuit courts, including the Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits, have recognized the 
copyright misuse doctrine.134  These courts, however, have not followed a 
 
 126. ASCAP is an acronym for the American Society of Composers, Authors, and 
Publishers. Id.  It is a voluntary association that protects performing rights.  About ASCAP, 
AM. SOC’Y COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2013).  The plaintiffs in this case were ASCAP members. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. at 
844. 
 127. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. at 846, 850. 
 128. Id. at 850. 
 129. Id. at 846. 
 130. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 131. Id. at 972. 
 132. Id. at 974.  The court further stated that “a misuse of copyright defense is inherent in 
the law of copyright just as a misuse of patent defense is inherent in patent law.” Id. at 973. 
 133. Id. at 979. 
 134. Charnelle, supra note 17, at 171; see Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 
772 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 
1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 
Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976; United Tel. Co. of 
Mo. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610–12 (8th Cir. 1988); Saturday Evening Post 
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uniform method of analysis in addressing the copyright misuse defense.  
This Note discusses the two approaches that have most commonly been 
applied by courts:  a public policy approach and an antitrust approach. 
While the focus of this Note is copyright misuse in the context of tying 
arrangements, most of the discussion is also applicable to other areas of 
intellectual property law. 
B.  An Introduction to Antitrust Law 
Antitrust law seeks to protect market competition “by setting limits on 
the collusive and predatory conduct and monopolistic abuses that free 
markets often breed.”135  The sources of antitrust law in the United States 
are federal laws, state laws, and judicial jurisprudence.  Of most importance 
is the Sherman Act, a federal law passed in 1890 in “an effort to codify the 
English common law governing restraints of trade and monopolies.”136  
Subsequently, a number of federal statutes, like the Clayton Act, and 
regulations, promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission, were 
created.137  These federal antitrust laws clearly signified that “Congress was 
dealing with competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which 
it sought to prevent.”138  In addition, most states have enacted general 
antitrust statutes with the Sherman Act as the foundation.139  Finally, as is 
often the case with legislation, judicial interpretation has shaped and 
defined antitrust law.140 
This section provides an overview of the historical context that 
necessitated the enactment of the Sherman Act, explains its provisions 
applicable to tying arrangements, and ultimately describes the antitrust law 
treatment of tying arrangements. 
 
Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1199–1201 (7th Cir. 1987); CBS, Inc. v. Am. 
Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, 607 F.2d 543, 544–45 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 135. DOUGLAS BRODER, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND ENFORCEMENT:  A PRACTICE 
INTRODUCTION 2 (2010).  “The design of the Sherman Act was intended to restore the balance 
between necessary business arrangements having primarily reasonable objectives and 
effects, and arrangements which were unduly restrictive and attributable to anticompetitive 
motives.” 1 EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 240-41 (1980); see also United 
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in general, and the 
Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.  They are as important to 
the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is 
to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”). See generally Ramsey Hanna, 
Misusing Antitrust:  The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 401 (1994). 
 136. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:  AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 8 (2000). 
 137. BRODER, supra note 135, at 6–7. 
 138. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951) (quoting A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. 
v. FTC, 135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943)). 
 139. BRODER, supra note 135, at 2. 
 140. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 136, at 8 (“The broadly worded provisions of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts have invited—indeed required—judicial construction.”). 
98 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
 
1.  Brief History:  The “Trust” Problem  
Gives Birth to Antitrust Laws 
American antitrust policies were influenced by English common law 
relating to trade and monopolies.141  During the nineteenth century, the old 
English common law definition of agreements in “restraint of trade” was 
expanded from not-to-compete covenants to “restrictions on trade in 
general.”142  This newly defined concept of trade restrictions marked the 
beginning of efforts by “American courts [to] mold[] the broadened 
doctrine into a useful, if imperfect, general antimonopoly instrument.”143  
With respect to public grants of monopolies, England’s Statute of 
Monopolies of 1623 represented “the formal culmination of English 
opposition to” grants of monopolies which restrained trade; such opposition 
later “became an established part of the American tradition.”144 
Aside from British influences, the economic climate in the United States 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century further pushed the 
application of the common law, and brought to light the significance of 
laws regulating competitive behaviors.145  During that time period, a 
number of businesses and organizations consolidated to create what became 
known as “trusts.”146  The trusts were originally formed as means of 
protecting competitors from the “[f]ierce cutthroat competition” that 
accompanied the laissez-faire era,147 but they ultimately restrained 
competition instead by appropriating markets and profits among its 
members.148  The states were first to respond to public disapproval of trusts 
and similar agreements.149  At least twenty-six states outlawed 
arrangements that stifled competition via statutory or constitutional 
prohibitions.150  Despite their efforts, the states were unable to adequately 
address the nationally reaching “trusts” problem due to a “lack of 
coordinated and aggressive public prosecution,”151 as well as “jurisdictional 
and legislative limitations.”152  With this background, the Sherman Act was 
 
 141. HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 36 (1954). 
 142. WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN & C. PAUL ROGERS III, ANTITRUST LAW:  POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 7 (3d ed. 1999). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 6. 
 145. See BRODER, supra note 135, at 6–7. 
 146. See generally JOHN MOODY, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRUSTS:  A DESCRIPTION AND 
ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN TRUST MOVEMENT, at xii–xiv (1904). 
 147. KINTNER, supra note 135, at 80. 
 148. Id. at 81. 
 149. Id. at 129; see Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of 
Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 606 (2012) (“At the turn of the nineteenth century, antitrust 
emerged because of the public’s fear of ‘trusts.’”). 
 150. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK 4 
(2d ed. 2008). 
 151. ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 142, at 8. 
 152. Richard E. Donovan, Antitrust Litigation, in COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK 
STATE COURTS § 89:7 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
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enacted “to supplement . . . the preexisting antitrust enforcement engaged in 
by the states.”153 
2.  The Sherman Act:  The Cornerstone of Antitrust Policy 
The Sherman Act is named for Republican Senator John Sherman.154  
His 1888 resolution was adopted by the Senate without debate155 and 
signed by President Benjamin Harrison into law in 1890,156 thereby 
producing “the first general statute dealing with the trust problem.”157  The 
Sherman Act was formally titled, “An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce 
Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies.”158  The Act’s original 
objectives can be inferred from its formal title, as well as the significant role 
its enforcement plays in today’s competitive market.159 
Immediately after its passage, the government successfully “curb[ed] the 
power and monopolistic abuses of the trusts that had come to dominate the 
American economic scene”160 by using “its newfound power to break up 
trusts or cartels in the steel, rail, and petroleum industries.”161  Since then, 
the aggressiveness of antitrust enforcement has varied in response to the 
economic and political climate at any given period.162  Despite such 
variations, it is widely accepted today that the Sherman Act is the most 
important source of federal statutory authority in antitrust policy.163 
The first two sections of the Sherman Act, which are most relevant in the 
context of tying arrangements, “contain the substantive matter of the act, 
defining the offenses and providing certain penalties.”164  Section 1 states, 
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”165  Section 2 prohibits 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. THORELLI, supra note 141, at 166. 
 155. Id. 
 156. KINTNER, supra note 135, at 238. 
 157. THORELLI, supra note 141, at 166. 
 158. KINTNER, supra note 135, at 125–26. 
 159. Id.; see N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1958) (“The Sherman Act 
was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and 
unfettered competition as the rule of trade.  It rests on the premise that the unrestrained 
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the 
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time 
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and 
social institutions . . . .  [T]he policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.”). 
 160. ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 142, at 22. 
 161. BRODER, supra note 135, at 6. 
 162. See id. at 4. 
 163. See KINTNER, supra note 135, at 125 (“The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is the 
cornerstone of American antitrust policy.”). 
 164. THORELLI, supra note 141, at 221. 
 165. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
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monopolization, attempt, or conspiracy “to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”166   
3.  The Treatment of Tying Arrangements Under Antitrust Law 
Tying arrangements are generally asserted under one or both of the first 
two sections of the Sherman Act.  Since both of these sections are written in 
broad terms, judicial interpretation plays an important role in defining their 
reach.167  Earlier cases evidenced a strong disapproval of tying 
arrangements.  For instance, in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United 
States, Justice Harlan stated that 
‘tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of 
competition.’  They deny competitors free access to the market for the 
tied product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a 
better product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in 
another market.  At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free 
choice between competing products.  For these reasons ‘tying agreements 
fare harshly under the laws forbidding restraints of trade.’168 
However, courts have subsequently moved away from such strong anti–
tying arrangement views while still maintaining the illegality of these 
practices.  For example, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 
the Court stated that 
not every refusal to sell two products separately can be said to restrain 
competition.  If each of the products may be purchased separately in a 
competitive market, one seller’s decision to sell the two in a single 
package imposes no unreasonable restraint on either market, particularly 
if competing suppliers are free to sell either the entire package or its 
several parts.169 
As Jefferson Parish established and later courts upheld, not every 
instance of tying is unlawful.  Tying arrangements are “an object of 
antitrust concern . . . [when they] force buyers into giving up the purchase 
of substitutes for the tied product [or] destroy the free access of competing 
suppliers of the tied product to the consuming market.”170  In other words, 
when a tying arrangement has anticompetitive effects, it is condemned 
 
 166. Id. § 2. 
 167. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 136, at 7.  It is also because of this “flexible, 
practical approach, by which challenged conduct would be evaluated in light of continuing 
experience as to its effect on competition in evolving economic conditions, that the Sherman 
Act has retained its essential character and vitality since its enactment.” KINTNER, supra note 
135, at 239. 
 168. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (quoting Standard Oil Co. of 
Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949), and Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 594, 606 (1953)). 
 169. 466 U.S. 2, 11–12, (1984), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 
U.S. 28 (2006). 
 170. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44–45 (1962) (citation omitted), 
abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
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under antitrust laws “even if one or more of the products in question is 
[protected].”171 
These arrangements fall under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which 
forbids agreements that restrain trade or commerce.  Because tying 
arrangements can exist without restraining trade, “[n]ot all tying agreements 
are illegal.”172  Meanwhile, some categories of tying arrangements, at least 
in theory, always restrain trade and thus are per se illegal.173  Arrangements 
that restrain trade, yet are not per se illegal, are analyzed under the rule of 
reason.174 
These two legal frameworks, per se illegality and the rule of reason, are 
generally applied by courts in determining whether challenged conduct 
amounts to an antitrust violation.  The alleged unlawful conduct can be 
subject to minimal judicial scrutiny under per se illegality, or to a more 
searching analysis under the rule of reason.175  While the per se analysis 
entails “a conclusive presumption of net anticompetitive effects,” the rule of 
reason “requires a court to engage in case-specific evaluation of evidence 
bearing on actual or predictable competitive effects.”176 
Under both rules, the burden of proof falls on the plaintiff to show that 
the challenged agreement or conduct violates the Sherman Act by 
unreasonably restraining competition.177  In the context of tying 
arrangements, “this burden necessarily involves an inquiry into the actual 
effect of the challenged conduct on competition in the” market of the tied 
product.178  The defendant has the burden of proof to establish the existence 
of a business justification under a rule of reason analysis and any other 
affirmative defenses.179 
The following subsections further discuss the application of both rules 
with respect to tying arrangements.  It should be noted that although the 
case law discussed in these sections involves patents and not copyrighted 
works, this distinction is less of a concern here, where the focus is on the 
 
 171. HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 19, at 21–27. 
 172. BRODER, supra note 135, at 50. 
 173. Id. at 46, 50. 
 174. Id. at 51; see also U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1185 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“If the particular licensing arrangement in question is not one of those 
specific practices that has been held to constitute per se misuse, it will be analyzed under the 
rule of reason.”). See generally Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of Doubt:  A Critique 
of the Rule of Reason in U.S. Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 591, 607 (2012). 
 175. See BRODER, supra note 135, at 50–51. See generally Markham, supra note 174, at 
593. 
 176. Markham, supra note 174, at 593. 
 177. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29 (1984), abrogated by Ill. 
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see also Moore v. James H. 
Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 178. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 90 (2009). 
 179. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
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methods of analyses generally utilized in antitrust law and not on the 
specific intellectual property at issue. 
a.  The Per Se Rule 
Trade restraints are per se illegal only if they constitute a “naked 
restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except [the] stifling of competition.”180  
Justice Marshall explained the rationale behind the per se rule as follows: 
 Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness.  They are justified 
on the assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far 
outweigh the losses and that significant administrative advantages will 
result.  In other words, the potential competitive harm plus the 
administrative costs of determining in what particular situations the 
practice may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result.  If 
the potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then 
they are simply not worth identifying in individual cases.181 
Per se analysis is not commonly applied by courts and is limited to cases 
where “experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to 
predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.”182  Even 
when the per se analysis is applied, “‘considerable inquiry into market 
conditions’ may be required before . . . condemnation is justified.”183  For a 
tying agreement to constitute a per se violation, the plaintiff must establish 
four elements:184  (1) the products or services are separate,185 (2) the sale or 
licensing of one product is conditioned on the sale or licensing of another 
product,186 (3) the seller has sufficient economic power in the tying 
 
 180. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (quoting White Motor Co. v. 
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)); see also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14 (1983) 
(“[T]he law draws a distinction between the exploitation of market power by merely 
enhancing the price of the tying product, on the one hand, and by attempting to impose 
restraints on competition in the market for a tied product, on the other.”); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–50 (1977) (holding that per se rules are “appropriate 
only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive”). 
 181. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 182. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); see also Broad. 
Music, 441 U.S. at 9–10 (“[I]t is only after considerable experience with certain business 
relationships that courts classify them as per se violations.”). 
 183. Markham, supra note 174, at 610; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) (“[W]hile the court has spoken of a ‘per se’ rule against 
tying arrangements, it has also recognized that tying may have procompetitive justifications 
that make it inappropriate to condemn without considerable market analysis.”). 
 184. See JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, PETER SULLIVAN, MAUREEN MCGUIRL, RALPH 
FOLSOM & FRANK FINE, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 22.02[1] (2d ed. 2012). 
 185. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1218 (3d Cir. 
1976); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Support Servs., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 945, 951 
(W.D.N.C. 2000). 
 186. See Abercrombie v. Lum’s Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 391 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Hammond 
Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 39 F.R.D. 604, 605–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
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product’s market to be able to enforce the tie-in,187 and (4) a “not 
insubstantial” amount of commerce in the tied product’s market is 
foreclosed.188  As to the third element, requiring market power,189 some 
courts have endorsed a more searching analysis, requiring proof of power in 
the relevant market or presence of a tie-in between an unpatented and a 
patented product before concluding that the arrangement is unlawful.190  
Further, in practice, the fourth requirement providing “that the tie must 
affect a substantial volume of commerce in the tied-product market is 
virtually always met, even where the volume of affected commerce is 
slight.”191 
International Salt Co. v. United States192 provides an example of the 
application of the per se analysis.  In International Salt Co., the government 
brought an action against International Salt, patent owner “on two machines 
for utilization of salt products.”193  The government alleged that the 
restriction in the leases requiring “lessees to purchase from [International] 
all unpatented salt and salt tablets consumed in the leased machines” 
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.194  Based on the finding that the 
contracts at issue affected a volume of business that “cannot be said to be 
insignificant or insubstantial,” and the rationale that it “is unreasonable, per 
se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market,” the Court held 
that “International has engaged in a restraint of trade for which its patents 
afford no immunity from the antitrust laws.”195 
b.  The Rule of Reason 
Although the per se analysis may provide for greater administrative 
convenience, courts more frequently engage in the searching rule of reason 
analysis.196  The rule of reason requires a determination of whether the 
practice’s procompetitive aspects outweigh its anticompetitive harm.197  
The plaintiff must “do far more to prove the unreasonableness of the alleged 
 
 187. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461–79 
(1992); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1958).  Note that in contrast to a 
per se analysis, under the rule of reason a tying violation may be established despite the 
absence of this element. See infra Part I.B.3.b. 
 188. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14–22 (1984), abrogated 
by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 
5–6. 
 189. Also called “monopoly power.” See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 466. 
 190. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 43. 
 191. Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse As Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 501 (2011). 
 192. 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
 193. Id. at 394. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 396. 
 196. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[M]ost antitrust claims are analyzed 
under a ‘rule of reason.’”). 
 197. See BRODER, supra note 135, at 51–52. 
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practice than where the allegations involve per se illegality.”198  Ultimately, 
the factfinder “must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an 
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of 
factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its 
conditions before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s 
history, nature, and effect.”199  In Board of Trade of Chicago v. United 
States, the Court explained the factors and information to be considered as 
follows: 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely 
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such 
as may suppress or even destroy competition.  To determine that question 
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to 
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint 
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.  
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for 
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, 
are all relevant facts.200 
Furthermore, some courts have held that a rule of reason violation can be 
established in the absence of market power, a requirement for per se 
illegality, so long as the plaintiff can prove sufficient anticompetitive 
impact in the tied product.201  The rule of reason analysis is also 
distinguishable from the per se rule in that it allows the proponent of the 
alleged tying arrangement “to argue that she had a legitimate business 
justification for imposing a tie-in.”202  For instance, the business 
justification functions as a defense to the misuse doctrine under a rule of 
reason analysis, excusing the copyright owner’s misuse so long as it was 
motivated by a legitimate purpose.203 
Essentially, the underlying rationale behind the rule of reason analysis is 
that a single factor is not decisive on its own, but “[r]ather, the fact finder 
‘weighs all of the circumstances’ in deciding whether the challenged 
 
 198. Id. at 51. 
 199. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10. 
 200. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (“The rule of reason is the 
accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of § 1. ‘Under 
this rule, the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a 
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on 
competition.’ Appropriate factors to take into account include ‘specific information about the 
relevant business’ and ‘the restraint’s history, nature, and effect. Whether the businesses 
involved have market power is a further, significant consideration.” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977), and State Oil 
Co., 522 U.S. at 10)). 
 201. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262–63 (1963); N. Pac. Ry. Co. 
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1958). 
 202. CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  
CASES AND MATERIALS 138 (2011). 
 203. See Times Herald Printing Co. v. A.H. Belo Corp., 820 S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tex. App. 
1991). 
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practice is, on balance, competitively unreasonable.”204  Nonetheless, 
despite attempts to define the rule of reason, many questions remain 
unsettled.  For instance, it is “unclear whether, and at what stage of the case 
a plaintiff is required to establish market power,” and whether the 
anticompetitive effects can be merely theoretical.205 
II.  THE PUBLIC POLICY APPROACH VERSUS  
THE ANTITRUST APPROACH 
More than two decades since the copyright misuse doctrine was first 
recognized explicitly in Lasercomb, a uniform approach to determining 
whether a specific behavior constitutes misuse still does not exist.  A tying 
arrangement can give rise to the copyright misuse defense either because it 
violates copyright principles as framed by the Constitution, or because it 
violates federal and state antitrust principles.  This Note seeks to highlight 
the shortfalls of each of these commonly applied approaches through a 
discussion of selected copyright misuse cases. 
A.  The Application of the Public Policy Approach 
The public policy approach is the more prominent method of evaluating 
copyright misuse.  Under this approach, the misuse defense “continue[s] to 
be available against conduct that violates antitrust law,” but is also 
“available for practices that undermine [intellectual property] policies 
without violating antitrust law.”206  This section discusses four landmark 
cases in which the courts have applied the public policy approach in 
evaluating copyright misuse. 
1.  Fourth Circuit:  Defense Prevails 
The Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb clearly underscored the independence 
of copyright misuse from antitrust principles.  In this case, the court stated 
that 
 
 204. WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:10 
(2012–2013 ed. 2012). 
 205. Markham, supra note 174, at 638 (“Possibly the most important turn of events in a 
rule of reason case is when the judge decides whether a plaintiff’s burden includes proof of 
market power, yet the case law is inconsistent as to whether and when proof of market power 
is a requisite element of a plaintiff’s antitrust conspiracy case.”); see HOLMES & 
MANGIARACINA, supra note 204, § 2:10 (“The courts appear to be currently split on whether 
proof of actual anticompetitive effects such as supracompetitive prices, reduced output, or 
diminished service quality is required to prove a violation of the rule of reason, or whether it 
is enough to show a substantial risk of anticompetitive effects in light of the defendants’ 
market power and the nature and market context of the challenged conduct.”). 
 206. Bohannan, supra note 191, at 478; see also Charnelle, supra note 17, at 177 (“[T]he 
[misuse] doctrine is broader than antitrust law and principles so that it can provide a defense 
to copyright infringement even in cases where the misuse of the copyright would not violate 
antitrust laws and principles.”). 
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while it is true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust 
law probably would give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the 
converse is not necessarily true—a misuse need not be a violation of 
antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable defense to an infringement 
action.  The question is not whether the copyright is being used in a 
manner violative of antitrust law (such as whether the licensing agreement 
is “reasonable”), but whether the copyright is being used in a manner 
violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.207 
Accordingly, the court plainly rejected reliance on the “‘rule of reason’ 
concept of antitrust law,”208 and instead endorsed the public policy 
approach.209  The court stated that the Constitution gave Congress the 
power to create copyright laws in order to promote progress,210 and thus 
using the copyright in a manner which inhibits progress violates copyright 
law’s underlying public policy.211  In Lasercomb, the licensing agreement 
inhibited progress by prohibiting licensees from creating new software 
which in return prevented “new ideas and knowledge” from being 
introduced “into the public domain.”212  This restriction was therefore 
found to be a misuse of the copyright pursuant to the public policy 
analysis.213 
While Lasercomb involved restrictive licensing and not a tying 
arrangement, it is important to note that “the reasoning of Lasercomb does 
not turn on the particular type of anti-competitive behavior alleged,”214 and 
was later cited by courts applying the public policy approach to the 
copyright misuse defense in the context of tying arrangements.215  Most 
importantly, Lasercomb makes clear that the balance between increasing 
“the store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding inventors and authors 
with the exclusive rights to their works for a limited time,” and limiting that 
“granted monopoly power” by ensuring that it does not “extend to property 
not covered by the . . . copyright,” is necessary in order to hold true to the 
framers’ purpose of promoting progress.216  Where that balance lies is often 
determinative of how a court applying the public policy approach will rule 
on the copyright misuse defense. 
 
 207. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990) (emphasis 
added). 
 208. Id. at 977 (“If, as it appears, the district court analogized from the ‘rule of reason’ 
concept of antitrust law, we think its reliance on that principle was misplaced.”). 
 209. Id. at 975. 
 210. Id. (“In giving Congress the power to create copyright and patent laws, the framers 
combined the two concepts in one clause, stating a unitary purpose—to promote progress.”). 
 211. Id. at 979. 
 212. Id. at 975. 
 213. Id. at 979. 
 214. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1169–70 (1st Cir. 
1994), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). 
 215. See, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 
1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998); infra Part II.B.2.b. 
 216. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976. 
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2.  Ninth Circuit:  Defense Prevails 
The Ninth Circuit tracked Lasercomb’s application of the public policy 
approach in Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical 
Ass’n.217  In Practice Management, the American Medical Association 
(AMA) licensed its copyrighted publication of the Physician’s Current 
Procedural Terminology (CPT) on the condition that the federal agency, 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), would not use any other 
competing coding system.218  Practice Management, a publisher and 
distributor of medical reference works, brought suit claiming that the AMA 
misused its copyright by entering into that agreement.219  In its opinion, the 
court did not explicitly use tying language and instead referred to the issue 
in terms of the “exclusivity requirement”;220 nonetheless, the licensing 
agreement is an example of a tying arrangement, or more specifically a tie-
out, as evidenced by the fact that the AMA licensed its CPT only on the 
condition that the HCFA would not use any other coding system.221 
In determining whether the AMA’s licensing terms constituted copyright 
misuse, the Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s determination 
in Lasercomb, rejected the argument that the defendant must “prove an 
antitrust violation to prevail.”222  The court subsequently held that “Practice 
Management established its misuse defense” because it demonstrated that 
the AMA’s use of the copyright violated public policy.223  The Ninth 
Circuit, however, departed from the view of the Fourth Circuit as to what 
public policy entails. 
In contrast with Lasercomb, Practice Management did not emphasize the 
importance of promoting progress or address how a copyright should not be 
used in a manner that interferes with that goal.  While the court came close 
to expressing similar goals in stating that “copyrightability of the CPT 
provides the economic incentive for the AMA to produce and maintain the 
CPT,” and destroying it could “prove destructive of the copyright interest, 
in encouraging creativity,”224 it ultimately found a violation of public 
policy on different grounds.  The court stated: 
What offends the copyright misuse doctrine is . . . the limitation imposed 
by the AMA licensing agreement on HCFA’s rights to decide whether or 
not to use other forms as well. Conditioning the license on HCFA’s 
 
 217. 121 F.3d at 521 (“We agree with the Fourth Circuit that a defendant in a copyright 
infringement suit need not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a copyright misuse 
defense.”). 
 218. Id. at 517. 
 219. Id. at 518. 
 220. Id. at 521. 
 221. Id. at 518. 
 222. Id. at 521. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 518 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 5.06[C], at 5-92 (1996)). 
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promise not to use competitors’ products constituted a misuse of the 
copyright by the AMA. 
. . . The terms under which the AMA agreed to license use of the CPT to 
HCFA gave the AMA a substantial and unfair advantage over its 
competitors.  By agreeing to license the CPT in this manner, the AMA 
used its copyright “in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in 
the grant of a copyright.”225 
Therefore, it can be inferred that in the view of the Ninth Circuit, 
behavior amounts to a public policy violation if limitations are imposed on 
the licensee and if the copyright holder consequently gains a “substantial 
and unfair advantage over its competitors.”226  Interestingly, neither 
Lasercomb nor the constitutional copyright grant mentions the effects of the 
copyright use, or misuse, on competitors. 
The Practice Management approach, nevertheless, is readily 
distinguishable from the antitrust rule of reason approach.  First, the court 
did not appear to be balancing the procompetitive against the 
anticompetitive effects of the licensing agreement, either directly or 
indirectly.  In fact, the court did not recognize any procompetitive aspects 
of the agreement at all.  Further, under a rule of reason analysis, the court 
would take “into account a variety of factors, including specific information 
about the relevant business, its conditions before and after the restraint was 
imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”227  The court here, 
however, did not contemplate a number of factors, but in contrast opined, 
“The controlling fact is that HCFA is prohibited from using any other 
coding system.”228  Most importantly, the court did not decide, or seek to 
decide, whether the agreement imposed an “unreasonable restraint on 
competition.”229 
A finding that a behavior results in a “substantial and unfair advantage” 
over competitors, as the court found here, is not dispositive of the presence 
of unreasonable restraints on competition.230  If a competitor is at a 
disadvantage because, for example, its product is inferior, the court would 
surely not find a restraint on competition based on that fact alone.  
Similarly, being at a disadvantage as a result of a competitor’s tying 
arrangement does not translate into a finding of a restraint on competition.  
More precisely, a disadvantage in competing is not equivalent to a restraint 
on others’ ability to compete or to enter the market altogether. 
 
 225. Id. at 521 (quoting Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 
1990)). 
 226. Id. 
 227. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
 228. Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 521. 
 229. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10. 
 230. Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 521. 
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3.  Fifth Circuit:  Defense Prevails 
In Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., the plaintiff, Alcatel 
(formerly DSC Communications Corporation (DSC)), possessed copyright 
protection for the operating system software which controlled the switches 
it designed and manufactured for long-distance telephone service 
providers.231  The licensing agreement of the copyrighted software 
prohibited the customer “from copying the software or disclosing it to third 
parties,” and authorized the software’s use “only in conjunction with DSC-
manufactured equipment.”232  DSC brought suit alleging that despite the 
licensing terms, as a way of expanding the call-handling capacity of 
switches, DGI illegally copied DSC’s operating system code.233  In 
response, DGI asserted copyright misuse as a defense.234 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit recognized Lasercomb’s approach, stating 
that “the public policy which includes original works within the granted 
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the original 
expression.”235  Pursuant to that rationale, the court held that “despite the 
jury’s finding that DGI acted with unclean hands in its acquisition and use 
of DSC’s copyrighted software,” it was not “barred from invoking an 
equitable defense”236 of copyright misuse and “[a] reasonable juror could 
conclude, based on the licensing agreement, that ‘DSC ha[d] used its 
copyrights to indirectly gain commercial control over products DSC d[id] 
not have copyrighted.’”237  The court reached this holding after a detailed 
discussion of how the agreement inhibited DGI from creating its own 
software.  For example, the court opined: 
Despite the presence of some evidence . . . that DGI could have developed 
its own software, there was also evidence that it was not technically 
feasible to use a non-DSC operating system because the switch has a 
‘common control’ scheme in which each microprocessor card in a 
network of such cards runs the same operating system.  Hence, without 
the freedom to test its cards in conjunction with DSC’s software, DGI was 
effectively prevented from developing its product, thereby securing for 
DSC a limited monopoly over its uncopyrighted microprocessor cards.238 
The court thus acknowledged that DGI may not have been completely 
prevented from creating its own software, but found it sufficient that there 
was evidence suggesting that it was not technically feasible for DGI to do 
so.  If an action is not technically feasible, then a competitor is unlikely to 
 
 231. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 778. 
 234. Id. at 792. 
 235. Id. at 793 (quoting jury instructions from DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 
898 F. Supp. 1183 (1995)). 
 236. Id. at 794. 
 237. Id. at 793. 
 238. Id. at 794. 
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pursue it, and in return, the public domain will be deprived of the 
additional, and potentially superior, product.  Essentially, the determinative 
point in this case was that the licensing agreement violated the public policy 
of promoting progress and immobilized “[t]he purpose of copyright law 
[which] is to promote and protect creativity.”239  Accordingly, in Alcatel, 
the court’s framing of the public policy analysis mirrored that of 
Lasercomb.240  Interestingly, in Alcatel, the possibility of engaging in an 
antitrust analysis of the misuse defense was not even proposed, which 
reflects the court’s strong adherence to the public policy approach. 
4.  Ninth Circuit:  Defense Fails 
Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp.241 is a recent case where the interpretation of 
the relationship between the misuse defense and antitrust principles was 
determinative of the outcome.  In the interest of clarity, this Note breaks the 
Apple Inc. litigation into three stages:  the first stage covers the district 
court’s finding as to Psystar’s motion for leave to amend in order to assert 
counterclaims under the misuse doctrine (Apple I);242 the second stage 
briefly summarizes the district court’s ruling on the misuse defense (Apple 
II);243 and, the third and final stage discusses the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
regarding the district court’s rejection of Psystar’s misuse defense (Apple 
III).244 
This series of litigation commenced when Apple Inc. (Apple), the 
exclusive manufacturer and master licensor of the OS X operating system, 
asserted, among other claims, copyright infringement against Psystar Corp. 
(Psystar), the manufacturer and distributor of a tailored line of computers, 
for the unauthorized use of its computer operating system.245  Psystar 
counterclaimed, initially asserting antitrust violations.246  Apple 
successfully moved to dismiss those counterclaims.247 
Subsequently, in Apple I, Psystar moved for leave to amend in order to 
assert counterclaims under the copyright misuse doctrine.248  The basis for 
 
 239. Id. at 787 (emphasis added). 
 240. See Charnelle, supra note 17, at 187–88 (“The court’s reasoning was consistent with 
the reasoning behind Lasercomb because in both cases, the court found misuse where the 
copyright owner restricted the creative efforts of its licensees in developing competitive 
software resulting in an unlawful extension of the copyright grant. In addition, public 
welfare would be harmed and progress constrained because DGI would be prevented from 
advancing technology by developing better microprocessor cards.”). 
 241. 658 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 242. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., No. C 08-03251 WHA, 2009 WL 303046, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 6, 2009). 
 243. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 931, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 658 
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 244. Apple Inc., 658 F.3d at 1152. 
 245. Apple Inc., 2009 WL 303046, at *1. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
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Psystar’s misuse defense was rooted in the allegation that Apple had 
wrongfully “leveraged its Mac OS copyrights in order to gain exclusive 
rights with respect to Mac OS-compatible computer hardware systems . . . 
via its End User License Agreements (EULA), which specifically required 
the consumers to install Mac OS only on Apple-labeled computers.”249  
More precisely, Psystar contended that the tying of the software to the 
hardware constituted a misuse of Apple’s copyright of the Mac OS 
software. 
In ruling on the narrow issue of whether Psystar’s counterclaims could be 
amended, the district court quoted the Ninth Circuit in Practice 
Management, stating that “a defendant in a copyright infringement suit need 
not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a copyright misuse defense.”250  
Finding that the previous order addressed the antitrust but not the copyright 
claims, the district court granted Psystar’s motion, allowing it to assert the 
copyright misuse doctrine as an affirmative defense to Apple’s infringement 
claim.251 
A few months later, the same judge, sitting for the same court, ruled that 
Psystar could not prevail on the misuse defense and granted Apple’s motion 
for summary judgment in Apple II.252  Although the district court 
recognized the public policy rationale underlying the copyright grant, it 
found the case before it distinguishable from Practice Management on the 
ground that, while the copyright holder in Practice Management limited the 
use of competitors’ coding systems, “Apple ha[d] not prohibited purchasers 
of Mac OS X from using competitor’s products.  Rather, Apple ha[d] 
simply prohibited purchasers from using Mac OS X on competitor’s 
products.”253  The court further held that “Apple ha[d] not prohibited others 
from independently developing and using their own operating systems.  
Thus, Apple did not violate the public policy underlying copyright law or 
engage in copyright misuse.”254 
Psystar appealed to the Ninth Circuit in Apple III, asserting that by 
requiring the licensees to run their copies only on Apple computers, the 
licensing agreement tied the use of Apple’s software to its hardware, and 
thus should have been found to be “an unlawful attempt to extend copyright 
protection to products that are not copyrightable.”255  The court, however, 
was more persuaded by Apple’s response, in which it asserted “that to 
adequately demonstrate copyright misuse, Psystar must show either that the 
 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at *2 (quoting Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 
(9th Cir. 1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 251. Apple Inc., 2009 WL 303046, at *4. 
 252. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 931, 933 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 658 
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 253. Id. at 940. 
 254. Id. at 939. 
 255. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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license agreement restricts creativity or that it restricts competition.”256  
Applying this proposition to the facts, the court held that the license 
agreement did not restrict creativity or competition because “Psystar [was] 
free to develop both competing hardware and software,”257 and 
subsequently affirmed the granting of summary judgment on Psystar’s 
copyright misuse defense.258 
The court’s analysis in this case reflects a hybrid approach to the 
copyright misuse defense.  The court’s ruling permits the finding of misuse 
under two conditions:  (1) if the licensing agreement restricts creativity; or 
(2) if the licensing agreement restricts competition.259  The first condition is 
consistent with the rulings in both Lasercomb and Alcatel where the public 
policy interest was phrased in terms of promoting progress, and 
undoubtedly restricting creativity would dampen that interest. 
As to the second condition, it seems to build on the Ninth Circuit’s prior 
decision in Practice Management where the court found the copyright’s 
“substantial and unfair advantage over its competitors” to be violative of the 
public policy embodied in the copyright grant.260  The court in Apple III 
takes another step in the direction of an antitrust analysis through the use of 
a more encompassing concept—restricting competition. 
Apple III can be compared to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United 
Telephone Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Publishing Co.261  In both cases, the 
misuse defense did not prevail because the tying arrangement did not 
“eliminate the possibility of . . . alternative method[s]” and consequently 
did not restrain competition.262  In United Telephone, the court clearly 
applied a rule of reason analysis.  In contrast, in Apple III, the court’s 
explicit reference to the public policy approach despite concurrently 
applying more of a rule of reason analysis, has further complicated an 
already perplexing defense. 
By articulating two separate and distinguishable bases for a tying 
arrangement to give rise to a prevailing copyright misuse defense, the court 
broadens the scope of such a defense.  As Apple III illustrates, however, the 
facts can be narrowly interpreted so that the defense ultimately fails.  This 
point is best illustrated by examining how the Ninth Circuit in Apple III 
distinguished the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Alcatel to reach an opposite 
conclusion on a factually similar case.  In Apple III, the Ninth Circuit 
stated: 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. 
 260. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997), 
amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 261. United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988); see 
infra Part II.B.2. 
 262. United Tel. Co., 855 F.2d at 612. 
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 Unlike the licensing agreement in Alcatel, Apple’s SLA [Software 
License Agreement] does not restrict competitor’s ability to develop their 
own software, nor does it preclude customers from using non-Apple 
components with Apple computers.  Instead, Apple’s SLA merely 
restricts the use of Apple’s own software to its own hardware.  As the 
district court properly concluded, Apple’s SLA has ‘not prohibited others 
from independently developing and using their own operating 
systems.’263 
However, the agreement in Alcatel provided, in relevant part, that “the 
customers [were] authorized to use the software only in conjunction with 
DSC-manufactured equipment.”264  As such, it did not expressly prohibit or 
restrict a competitor’s ability to develop their own software, but implicitly 
did so because it was “not technically feasible to use a non-DSC operating 
system . . . . [and] without the freedom to test its cards in conjunction with 
DSC’s software, DGI was effectively prevented from developing its 
product.”265 
Analogously, in Apple III, the licensing agreement which provided, in 
relevant part, that a user “agree[s] not to install, use or run the Apple 
Software on any non-Apple labeled computer, or to enable others to do 
so,”266 did not expressly prohibit competitors from creating their own 
software or limit the use of competitors’ hardware altogether.  It implicitly 
created such a limitation, however, because developing software is not an 
easy task, and it is at least conceivable that it might not have been 
technically feasible, or even possible, for Psystar to simply just develop its 
own “competing hardware and software.”267 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that even under a stricter application of 
Alcatel, Apple’s SLA would not have violated public policy based solely on 
the rationale that the ability to use Apple’s software with the competitor’s 
hardware would have given the consumers greater options.  Rather, it is 
probable that the defendant raising the defense would still need to prove 
that the restrictive agreement interfered with the goal of increasing “the 
store of human knowledge”268 or encouraging creativity pursuant to the 
underlying goals of the copyright grant. 
B.  The Application of the Antitrust Approach 
Other courts evaluate copyright misuse in tying arrangements under 
antitrust principles.  Pursuant to that approach, the analysis proceeds as it 
would if the claim had been brought as an antitrust violation.  Thus, as 
explained in Part I.B., the court would likely apply an antitrust rule of 
 
 263. Apple Inc., 658 F.3d at 1160. 
 264. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 265. Id. at 794. 
 266. Apple Inc., 658 F.3d at 1155. 
 267. Id. at 1152. 
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reason analysis, and while it may take into account public policy arguments, 
the core of the analysis would likely be focused on antitrust principles, such 
as restraints on competition and the existence of monopoly power.269 
1.  Seventh Circuit:  Defense Fails 
The Seventh Circuit has strongly advocated for the antitrust approach to 
intellectual property misuse.270  In USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 
USM brought an action alleging that the patentee, SPS, “committed patent 
misuse by including a differential royalty schedule in the license agreement 
entered into as part of [an earlier] settlement.”271  The Seventh Circuit 
rejected the public policy approach altogether, stating that it is “too vague a 
formulation to be useful; taken seriously it would put all patent rights at 
hazard.”272 
In Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., one of the issues 
the Seventh Circuit addressed was whether a no-contest clause in a 
licensing agreement, prohibiting the defendant from challenging the validity 
of the plaintiff’s copyright, constituted copyright misuse.273  To avoid 
setting forth a federal common law that would run afoul of the Sherman 
Act,274 the court held, “What is needed is a balancing of the pros and cons 
of the clause in each case . . . [which] is best done under antitrust law.”275  
The court then opined that it is unlikely that a copyright “would confer an 
economically significant monopoly, one that would raise the price of the 
monopolized good well above, and depress its output well below, the 
competitive level,”276 and concluded that “a no-contest clause in a 
copyright licensing agreement is valid unless shown to violate antitrust 
law.”277  The court further stated: 
‘If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by 
what principles shall they be tested?  Our law is not rich in alternative 
concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the date to try to 
develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent holders 
to debilitating uncertainty.’  This point applies with even greater force to 
copyright misuse, where the danger of monopoly is less.278 
Although USM Corp. did not involve a copyright or a direct tying 
arrangement and Saturday Evening Post Co. did not involve a tying 
arrangement, it can be reasonably inferred from both cases that the Seventh 
 
 269. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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Circuit would likely apply an antitrust analysis if presented with a copyright 
misuse defense arising out of a tying arrangement.  This is evident by the 
court’s antitrust analysis in both cases, strong opposition to the public 
policy approach in USM Corp., and fear of creating a “federal common law 
rule that would jostle uncomfortably with the Sherman Act.”279 
Further, it can be inferred from the court’s assertion that “the danger of 
monopoly is less”280 with copyrights than it is with patents that the court 
views copyrights and the threats posed on the market by copyright misuse 
as being less significant than those posed by patents.  Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to assume that in the context of copyrights the Seventh Circuit is 
unlikely to provide a defendant raising a misuse defense greater means—
such as would be provided under a public policy approach—of escaping 
liability from the infringement claim than it allowed in the context of 
patents. 
2.  Eighth Circuit:  Defense Fails 
In United Telephone Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Publishing Co.,281 the 
Eighth Circuit applied an antitrust analysis after acknowledging the 
copyright misuse defense.  The defendant asserted that the plaintiff, a 
publisher of white pages directories, misused the copyright by tying the 
“the purchase of the new entries . . . to the purchase of its entire 1985 
customer list.”282  The court held that because United Telephone’s license 
to reproduce its white pages listings did not “eliminate the possibility of an 
alternative method of updating Johnson’s city directories,”283 United 
Telephone did not “misuse[] its copyright by restraining competition.”284  
Hence, the court reached a holding based on traditional antitrust principles 
by applying a rule of reason test that considered other alternatives and 
restraints on competition. 
3.  First Circuit:  Defense Fails 
In Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., Data 
General Corporation (DG) brought a claim against Grumman Systems 
Support Corporation (Grumman) for copyright infringement of its 
MV/Advanced Diagnostic Executive System (ADEX), “a new software 
diagnostic for [DG’s] MV computers.”285  Based on undisputed evidence 
establishing Grumman’s illicit copying of ADEX, the lower court granted 
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summary judgment on the copyright infringement claim in favor of DG.286  
Grumman appealed, contending “that the district court prematurely 
dismissed its affirmative defenses and counterclaims.”287  One of 
Grumman’s affirmative defenses asserted that “DG [was] not entitled to 
enforce its copyrights . . . because it has ‘misused’ those property rights” by 
tying access to ADEX to the purchase of its aftermarket service, an “anti-
competitive behavior in violation of federal antitrust laws.”288  The First 
Circuit, however, found the misuse defense to be “devoid of merit” because 
of a lack of sufficient “evidence to justify a trial on . . . Grumman’s antitrust 
counterclaims.”289  While the court acknowledged Lasercomb’s public 
policy approach,290 it did not inquire into the public policy rationales 
underlying copyright laws that may have been implicated in this case.  By 
limiting its analysis to antitrust law, the court implicitly ruled that the 
misuse defense is predicated on a finding of an antitrust violation. 
In summary, the cases analyzed above demonstrate the lack of a uniform 
approach to the copyright misuse analysis.  These cases also suggest that 
under the antitrust analysis, the misuse defense is less likely to prevail 
because any behavior that does not harm competition would not amount to 
a misuse.  Thus, the approach applied by the court is crucial because it is 
often determinative of the defendant’s fate in the infringement litigation.  
Further, while much overlapping exists between the public policy and 
antitrust approaches, the two bodies of law underlying those approaches are 
rooted in different policy rationales and should not be confined to each 
other’s legal boundaries.291 
Consequently, a strict application of the antitrust approach in evaluating 
copyright misuse is inadequate because it fails to account for behaviors that 
do not restrict competition but work in opposition to public policy 
rationales embedded in copyright law, whether defined as encouraging 
creativity, improving public welfare, or the like.  At the same time, 
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supra Part II.A.2. 
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application of the public policy approach has been ambiguous and 
perplexing.292  Part III explores these inadequacies in greater detail to 
underscore the need for a different, and better structured, approach. 
III.  A THREE-TIERED EVALUATIVE APPROACH TO  
A BETTER-DEFINED PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 
This section first discusses the inadequacies of both the public policy and 
antitrust approaches to the copyright misuse analysis in the context of tying 
arrangements.  Subsequently, a three-tiered approach to the analysis is 
proposed which ratchets up and reframes the public policy approach.  The 
proposed approach is aimed at achieving uniformity without sacrificing the 
important underlying goals of copyright and antitrust laws. 
A.  The Public Policy Approach Yields Inconsistent Results 
Since a party prevailing on a copyright misuse defense can escape 
infringement liability, the outcome of the case often depends on the court’s 
ruling on the misuse defense.  As previously outlined,293 however, a 
uniform approach to evaluating this important defense is lacking,294 and 
even courts that purport to be applying the same approach have reached 
opposing results due to inconsistent determinations of what is violative of 
public policy.295  For instance, both the Fifth Circuit in Alcatel and the 
Ninth Circuit in Apple Inc. evaluated the misuse from a public policy 
perspective.296  Both cases concerned scenarios where the tying product 
was software and the tied product was manufactured by the copyright 
holder.297  Yet the two circuits reached different holdings with respect to 
whether the tying arrangement constitutes copyright misuse.298 
Further, drawing from the cases discussed in Part II, three types of tying 
arrangements that can give rise to misuse under the public policy approach 
can be extracted:  (1) arrangements that inhibit progress or discourage 
creativity,299 (2) arrangements which confer substantial and unfair 
advantage on the copyright holder,300 and (3) arrangements that either 
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restrict creativity or competition.301  Despite the potential appeal associated 
with the varying understandings of public policy, ultimately, the public 
policy approach provides no certainty to litigators.  This is due to the fact 
that judicial discretion plays a crucial role in defining “public policy”302 
and in determining the factors amounting to an expansion of the granted 
right, as evident in the cases discussed.303 
In the absence of a Supreme Court decision, courts have no guidance, 
aside from their subjective preferences, in deciding which public policy 
approach to apply.  Even more disconcerting is the present uncertainty 
regarding whether the public policy approach is appropriate to the copyright 
misuse analysis in the first place.  Furthermore, a strict application of the 
public policy approach disregards the fact that tying arrangements, by 
definition, reshape competition with respect to the products that are part of 
the arrangement and thus inevitably trigger antitrust principles.304  It is no 
surprise that “misuse has been criticized as being too vague and lacking 
coherence in both application and policy.”305 
B.  The Antitrust Approach Does Not Satisfy Policies 
Embedded in Copyright Law 
The antitrust approach does not achieve anything beyond the bounds of 
antitrust law.  In large part this is because antitrust law is confined to the 
antitrust framework, which is narrower in both scope and perspective than 
the intellectual property framework.306  Copyright protection “is intended to 
motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by the provision of a special 
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after 
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”307  Antitrust law, in 
contrast, is concerned with promoting and maintaining healthy market 
competition.308  Accordingly, copyright misuse should not be limited to the 
scope of antitrust law. 
Three plausible scenarios where the misuse defense could fail under the 
antitrust analysis approach but prevail under a public policy approach 
further illustrate the independence of the copyright misuse doctrine from 
antitrust principles.309  First, the copyright owner may exercise control over 
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areas outside the scope of the granted copyright monopoly, but without 
such control amounting to an antitrust claim.  Under antitrust laws, 
establishing market power in the tying market is a requirement for per se 
illegality and an important factor in weighing the anticompetitive against 
the procompetitive effects in a rule of reason analysis.310  Thus, a finding of 
market power is often indicative, or at least substantially indicative, of 
anticompetitive trade restraints in violation of the Sherman Act.311  
However, it is unlikely that a copyright will gain enough market power312 
to meet the searching scrutiny of antitrust laws because multiple similar 
copyrights can often lawfully coexist in the relevant market so long as each 
work is “independently created . . . [and] possesses at least some minimal 
degree of creativity.”313  Accordingly, under some circumstances, a misuse 
of the copyright might fail to meet the requirements of antitrust law even 
though such use undermines the policies behind copyright law.314  The 
public policy approach, by asking a different question, prevents such 
misuses from going unaccounted for in a copyright infringement claim. 
In the second scenario, the defendant may fail to, or simply decide not to, 
assert an antitrust violation as a basis for the misuse defense.  As the court 
in Data General Corp. acknowledged, “it is often more difficult to prove an 
antitrust violation when the claim rests on the questionable market power 
associated with a copyright” and the defendant might not be able to meet 
the necessary burden of proof.315 
In the third scenario, the defendant might rely solely on asserting 
antitrust violations in raising the misuse defense and still fail as a result of 
the court’s finding that antitrust laws have not been violated.316  For 
example, in Data General Corp., Grumman based its misuse defense solely 
on the alleged anticompetitive tying arrangement underlying the antitrust 
counterclaims, and the court dismissed the copyright misuse as a result of 
insufficient evidence as to the antitrust counterclaims.317 
In each of these three scenarios, the public policy approach inquiring into 
whether the plaintiff expanded “the statutory copyright monopoly in order 
 
 310. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461–79 
(1992); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1958); see Charnelle, supra note 
17, at 191 (“Antitrust violations often rest on the notion of finding market power, which 
requires a finding of a specified market share in the defined, relevant market.”). See generally 
supra Part I.B.3.a–b. 
 311. See generally Charnelle, supra note 17, at 191. 
 312. In Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., Judge Posner opined that it 
is unlikely that a copyright “would confer an economically significant monopoly, one that 
would raise the price of the monopolized good well above, and depress its output well 
below, the competitive level.” 816 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 313. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 314. See generally supra Part II.A. 
 315. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1170 (1st Cir. 
1994), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). 
 316. Id.; see supra Part II.B.3. 
 317. Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1170; see supra Part II.B.3. 
120 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
 
to gain control over areas outside the scope of the monopoly”318 would 
enable the defendant to present a different set of facts, and essentially 
answer a different legal question not limited to an antitrust analysis, which 
is predominately based on the determination of anticompetitive restraints on 
competition. 
It can even be argued that antitrust and copyright laws are in direct 
contention with each other.  Antitrust law aims to protect competition and 
copyright law aims to protect the competitors.  Antitrust law seeks to limit 
monopolistic behavior whereas copyright law grants a limited right to 
monopoly.319  At minimum, misuse is broader than antitrust principles, and 
particular conduct can constitute misuse without amounting to an antitrust 
violation.320 
Based on the foregoing, this Note argues in favor of a modified public 
policy approach.  Nonetheless, due to the subjective and uncertain aspects 
of the public policy analysis, public policy interests should first be 
grounded in the constitutional grant of authority.  Accordingly, the 
Lasercomb and Alcatel framing of the public policy analysis, in terms of 
whether the arrangement inhibits progress or creativity, should be adopted.  
Secondly, the public policy approach should not be viewed in a vacuum, 
and it should be treated as only part of a much more probing analysis.  
Accordingly, this Part proposes an approach under which the public policy 
question is only the first step in a three-step evaluation process.  
Additionally, in order to avoid an approach that would either work in 
opposition to, or impede application of, the Sherman Act,321 the suggested 
approach encompasses aspects of the antitrust rule of reason analysis, but is 
tailored to the specific goals of copyright law instead of focusing only on 
restraints to competition. 
C.  Copyright Misuse Should Be Analyzed 
Under a Three-Tiered Approach 
The current lack of uniformity deprives copyright owners of adequate 
notice as to what behaviors could potentially amount to misuse and lead to 
the detrimental result of being barred from recovery.  At the same time, a 
potential copyright infringer cannot predict, with an adequate degree of 
certainty, the likelihood of success in asserting copyright misuse as an 
affirmative defense, and is thus deprived of the opportunity to take into 
account all benefits and risks before deciding to infringe the copyright. 
 
 318. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 
2002). 
 319. See generally supra Part I. 
 320. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942); see also supra 
note 306 and accompanying text. 
 321. Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 
1987). 
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The resolution proposed in this Note aims to provide much-needed 
uniformity without irritating or overlooking important goals of both 
copyright and antitrust law.  This Note proposes a three-tiered framework, 
as follows.  First, the court must determine whether the tying arrangement 
is outside the scope and boundaries of the copyright grant.  If it is, the 
copyright misuse defense prevails.  If it is not, the court must next inquire 
about the availability of feasible economic alternatives for the defendant.  If 
there are, the defense fails.  If such alternatives do not exist, the court must 
last examine whether the copyright owner has any critical business 
justifications for the tying arrangement.  If so, the defense fails; if not, the 
defense prevails.  The alleged infringer carries the burden of proof for the 
first two inquiries and the copyright owner carries the burden for the final 
inquiry.  The following subsections describe the framework of the proposed 
approach in greater detail. 
1.  The Public Policy of Promoting Progress 
The first step is a determination of whether the challenged behavior is 
within the scope and boundaries of the copyright grant.  If the behavior is 
found to be outside the copyright grant, then the copyright misuse analysis 
comes to an end and the defense prevails.  If, however, the tying 
arrangement does not interfere with public policy goals, it should not be 
deemed per se unlawful, even if it is too attenuated or seemingly 
unreasonable, and the court should proceed to the second tier of the 
analysis. 
Since the behavior in question, or the specific tying arrangement giving 
rise to the defense, will almost certainly not be explicitly stated in the 
copyright certificate (assuming that the copyright is even registered),322 the 
question of whether the arrangement falls within the copyright grant is 
directly related to whether it violates the public policies supporting 
copyright law.  Accordingly, a mere showing of two separate products 
should not suffice and should not render the arrangement unlawful without 
further inquiry.  In contrast with the antitrust approach,323 the question here 
should be narrowly defined—whether the products are tied in such a 
manner that frustrates the public policy underlying copyright grants.  
Following Lasercomb and Alcatel, arrangements that inhibit progress or 
discourage creativity should be found to violate the public policy 
underlying copyright laws.324  Thus, this uniform conception of the public 
policy supporting copyright law, which is most in line with the language 
and objectives of the constitutional grant of copyright power,325 should be 
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applied to avoid inconsistent results as seen in prior cases purporting to 
apply the public policy approach.326 
Furthermore, a defendant asserting the copyright misuse defense should 
not be required to prove market power over “the tying product to enable it 
to restrain trade in the market for the tied product,” or that “a ‘not 
insubstantial’ amount of commerce in the market for the tied product is 
foreclosed.”327  These two elements are relevant to antitrust law because the 
evil it attempts to prevent directly relates to competition restraints and 
monopoly power.328  With copyright law, the focus is on finding a balance 
between rewarding the copyright holder and ensuring that the granted 
limited monopoly does not stifle progress;329 existence of trade restraints or 
monopoly power is not indicative of an encroachment on that goal. 
To illustrate, in the Apple iPhone and mapping application 
hypothetical,330 if a defendant in a copyright infringement claim 
successfully proves, by relying on market studies, expert testimonies, or 
other pertinent evidence, that the arrangement hinders progress in the 
mapping application market and is thus violative of public policy, then the 
misuse defense bars the plaintiff’s recovery.  If public policy goals are not 
frustrated, however, then the court proceeds to the second tier, inquiring 
into the economic feasibility of available alternatives.  In that manner, the 
public policy approach continues to be available for conduct that 
undermines copyright policies without discounting antitrust principles that 
tying arrangements often trigger.331 
2.  The Economic Feasibility of Available Alternatives 
Tying arrangements, by definition, affect market competition in the tied 
product, and thus antitrust principles and laws are inevitably triggered.  An 
analysis that stops at the public policy inquiry falls short, and is oblivious to 
the interplay between copyright law and antitrust law in balancing 
competition and monopoly forces in any given market.  The following two 
tiers of the analysis account for that interplay while remaining conscious 
that antitrust violations can be asserted independent of the copyright misuse 
doctrine.  Thus, the available alternatives and business justifications prongs, 
while important factors under the antitrust rule of reason analysis, are 
reframed here to address copyrights more specifically. 
The second tier of the proposed approach accounts for conduct that may 
not violate public policy per se, but ultimately has that effect.  In both 
Lasercomb and Alcatel, the agreements prohibited licensees from creating 
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new software—an example of conduct that directly hinders progress.332  
However, at times the arrangement in question does not directly impact 
progress but, instead, ultimately has that effect.333  When the cost of an 
alternative is substantial enough that a competitor in the tied product will 
likely not pursue it, then it is an unreasonable alternative.  To some extent, 
this resembles the hybrid approach applied in Apple Inc., because it 
essentially provides an alternative on which the defense can prevail in the 
absence of a public policy violation.  This step of the analysis is 
distinguishable from Apple Inc.’s approach, however, because the focus is 
not on the effects of the restraint on competition, but rather, more 
specifically on whether such restraint will inevitably hinder progress by 
making it infeasible to participate in the market of the tied product. 
In Apple Inc., the Ninth Circuit’s distinction of Alcatel is not very 
convincing.  Just as the Fifth Circuit in Alcatel held that it is not technically 
feasible for DGI to use a non-DSC operating system, it is presumably not 
technically feasible for Psystar to simply just develop its own competing 
hardware and software.334  Thus, applying this approach would have given 
Psystar the opportunity to prove that it could not simply develop its own 
software.  More precisely, a court applying the proposed approach would 
have reasonably reached the second tier of the analysis since the tying 
arrangement did not hinder progress, but rather prompted competitors to 
create their own products.  Subsequently, the court would have considered 
all other alternatives to being excluded from the market as a result of the 
tying arrangement, and Psystar would have had to prove the alternatives’ 
impracticability. 
This tier of the analysis, by determining all other available alternatives to 
the consequences arising out of the tying arrangement and evaluating their 
economic feasibility, aims to eliminate disparities in outcomes under the 
public policy approach.  In return, this ensures that the outcome of the 
defense does not turn on whether public policy was directly or indirectly 
violated. 
It is also notable that the analysis here is not as searching as the antitrust 
rule of reason335 because factors that do not directly relate to the feasibility 
of alternatives should not be considered dispositive.  In this context, the 
court is simply looking to see if the alternatives’ infeasibility provides for a 
compelling enough reason, in the absence of a public policy rationale, to 
proscribe the tying arrangement in question. 
For example, in an infringement claim brought against Google in the 
context of the Apple iPhone and mapping application hypothetical,336 this 
tier would play a crucial role in the analysis.  If Apple were able to prove 
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that the arrangement did not violate public policy because it did not hinder 
progress but rather encouraged its competitors to develop their own phones 
and mapping applications, Google would be given the opportunity to put 
forth the infeasibility of the alternatives.  If Google prevailed with respect 
to this assertion, Apple would be found to have engaged in copyright 
misuse.  In that manner, the modified public policy approach takes into 
account conduct that indirectly hinders progress by making it infeasible for 
competitors to participate in the market of the tied product. 
3.  The Critical Business Justifications 
If the tying arrangement is found to violate public policy or to negate any 
economically feasible alternatives, the misuse defense should prevail unless 
the copyright owner is able to establish critical business justifications.  This 
aspect of the analysis is similar to the antitrust legitimate business 
justification337 but is even more demanding because the court here would 
not be weighing a number of factors.  Rather, a court would inquire as to 
whether there is a business justification so critical that it trumps the 
underlying copyright goals.  To remain aligned with the constitutional 
copyright grant, the copyright owner’s business justification should directly 
relate to its ability to exercise the granted limited monopoly power without 
any unreasonable burdens or interferences.  Furthermore, this aspect of the 
analysis should be subject to the courts’ most searching review as a way of 
ensuring that it is not a free pass to copyright owners but only an available 
option, permitted with caution. 
With respect to the Apple mapping application hypothetical,338 it is 
difficult to conceive of any such critical need for Apple to tie its own 
mapping application to its iPhone.  Accordingly, pursuant to the proposed 
approach, if the arrangement is found to either violate public policy or the 
competitors’ alternatives are not feasible, Apple would be found to have 
misused its mapping application copyright. 
CONCLUSION 
The three-tiered approach proposed in this Note balances the burden of 
proof between the copyright owner and copyright infringer.  It provides 
judicial expediency for the more straightforward cases by allowing any 
arrangement that frustrates the public policy goals embodied in the 
constitutional grant of copyright power to be deemed per se illegal.  At the 
same time, in more complex cases, as the majority of cases are likely to be, 
it provides a multifaceted method of analysis under which the lack of 
economically feasible alternatives can establish misuse in favor of the 
defense, and the existence of critical business justifications can justify a 
tying arrangement that would otherwise constitute misuse. 
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The proposed approach aims to further the policy rationales underlying 
copyright law, without intruding upon or unnecessarily replicating the 
policy rationales of antitrust law.  More importantly, the proposed approach 
provides a defined framework, pursuant to which uniformity amongst 
courts can be achieved.  At a minimum, it is an initial step toward achieving 
uniformity and clarifying the currently ambiguous and complex copyright 
misuse defense. 
